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Race to Learn: Knowledge Characteristics and Resource Structure
Abstract
Purpose
This paper studies the impact of the interactive effect of knowledge characteristics –
tacitness, specificity and availability— and resource structure —complementarily and
asymmetric—on learning race behavior among International Joint Venture (IJV) partners
in China.
Design/methodology/approach
Preliminary in-depth interviews with three IJV managers were conducted to develop and
evaluate the tentatively developed questionnaire. The finalized survey questionnaire was
distributed to middle and top-level managers of IJVs, resulting in a total of 124 usable
surveys. The psychometric properties of data were evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha and
confirmatory factor analysis, and hypotheses were tested using a Generalized Linear
Model.
Findings
The results show that partners in IJV have low tendencies to acquire tacit and specific
knowledge, but, when the resource is complementary, it stimulates the learning race.
Also, when resources are asymmetric, IJV partners engage in the learning race more
aggressively, particularly for highly specific knowledge. The situation reverses for highly
available knowledge.
Research/practical implications
The findings provide important insights for both researchers and managers on knowledge
characteristics and resource structure influencing learning race behavior. This insight
allows firms to leverage features of knowledge and resource conditions to prevent or
facilitate the learning race for either common or private interests.
Keywords: IJV, knowledge characteristics, learning race, resource structure
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Introduction
International joint ventures (IJV) are the common vehicle used to enter international
markets. Through IJV, knowledge and resource are acquired and risks mitigated, as two
or more businesses with varying sets of know-how partner with a collaborative intent for
a set period (Dong, Zou, Sun, & Zhang, 2019; Kwon, 2008; Park & Vertinsky, 2016). In
previous studies, it is highlighted that learning in the IJV relationship is fraught with
obstacles where a competitive intent dominates the relationship. Firms are eager to learn
each other’s key competencies, such as superior customer skills and collaborative skills
(Hamel, 1991; Howard, Steensma, Lyles & Dhanaraj, 2016). Where ‘knowledge is
power’ tension arises between local partners seeking to learn and foreign partners trying
to protect valuable knowledge (Jordan & Lowe, 2004; Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000;
Rechberg, 2018). The opportunistic behavior of partners seeking to outlearn each other, is
called the ‘learning race’ and will be the focus of this study (Hamel, 1991; Khanna,
Gulati & Nohria, 1998).
Inkpen and Beamish, (1997) present that the motivation to outlearn partner at a
quicker pace arises from a firm’s desire to gain more bargaining power and independence
from the partner. The principle of learning race is grounded in the resource dependency
theory (RDT; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) – a firm acquiring valuable resources of another
firm will shift the balance of power in its favor (McKinley & Mone, 2003). RDT helps to
explain why learning race (de)escalates when different combinations of knowledge
characteristics (independent variables) and resource asymmetry (moderating variables)
are present. Drawing on RDT, we include resource complementarity and resource
asymmetry as contextual variables, which enables us to not only identify which type of
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knowledge is sought and transferred in IJV, by why competitive learning in IJV occurs.
For instance, the interaction of tacit and complementary expertise creates a unique
resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013), escalating learning race even though tacit knowledge
is difficult to copy. On the other hand, the interaction between knowledge availability
and resource complementarity reduces the learning race, although making knowledge
widely available allows partners to copy such knowledge easily. The understanding of
such intricate relationships and the underlying reasons are possible only by taking the IJV
resource structures into account.
Researchers have examined the mechanism of learning behavior in IJV (Dhanaraj
et al., 2004), the impact of such learning behavior on IJV performance (Park et al., 2015;
Sarkar et al., 2001; Dong et al., 2019), and the relationship between knowledge
characteristics and learning behavior (Yao et al., 2013; Hau & Evangelista, 2007; Kwok
et al., 2019; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). To the best of our knowledge, no studies
examine the factors that contribute to the learning race in IJV. For this reason, we analyze
the antecedents that cause learning race behavior of 124 IJVs in China by addressing how
knowledge characteristics and resource structures can leverage or obstruct learning race
behavior among partnering firms. We hope that our findings inform practitioners that
partner in IJV, and scholars about the ease with which knowledge may be copied, and the
benefits for pursuing to race to learn.
Theoretical Background
IJV learning race
Learning race refers to the intent of an organization in an IJV to outlearn its partner by
lowering knowledge transparency and acquiring partner’s knowledge at a quicker pace

Race to Learn -4
(Hamel 1991; Larsson et al., 1998). Even those firms that initially had no intent to gain
knowledge of a partnering firm may later reassess their strategy (Dong et al., 2019;
Inkpen, 2000). In pursuit of independence, IJV partners’ desire to learn from each other
may escalate over time. Inkpen and Beamish (1997, p. 177) termed this phenomenon of
learning from each other competitively the “race to learn.”
In competitive learning, a partner seeks to acquire another’s knowledge rather
than collaborate for mutual learning. Outlearning the partner enables implementing new
skills and functions without the support of the partner. As the relationship dependency
gets reduced, the bargaining power shifts (Hamel 1991; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Since
each partner is motivated to maximize its relative power by gaining more knowledge than
it gives, the IJV thrusts into a competitive learning race (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997;
Tsang, 2002). Once a firm in alliance outlearns its counterpart, its dependency on the
other will diminish. The newly acquired knowledge will allow the organization to
provide services or create products independently of the other.
Here we theorize that knowledge characteristics may significantly impact firms’
ability to engage in a learning race (Hau & Evangelista, 2007; Evangelista & Hau, 2009).
Merely having accessibility to a partner’s specific knowledge does not ensure knowledge
acquisition. The ability to absorb a partner firm’s knowledge and relationship with the
partnering firm also determines the effectiveness of knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 2000).
We examine if interactions between knowledge dimensions and resource structure
facilitate or hinder learning race in IJV. Specifically, we study three aspects of
knowledge: 1) tacitness, 2) specificity, and 3) availability. We further explore the
moderating role of the resource structure, which are resource complementarity and
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resource asymmetry, on the relationship between knowledge characteristics and learning
race.
Resource dependence theory (RDT)
RDT characterizes corporations as open systems facing environmental uncertainties.
Entering into an alliance helps firms gain access to valuable and complementary
resources that are difficult to replicate yet critical to address environmental uncertainties
(Das & Teng, 2000; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In
emerging markets, a local firm may provide knowledge about government relations, local
legislation and consumer behavior, whereas the foreign firm may provide managerial and
technological expertise (Kim, Chiou, & Calantone, 2018; Piaskowska, Nadolska, &
Barkema, 2017; Sharp & Barz, 1997). When a foreign firm does not have sufficient
resources or information to enter into an international market, establishing an IJV can
help that firm access such necessary resources, reducing uncertainty (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven 1996).
RDT presents that inter-partner relations enable dependency on other firms’
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In putting forward ‘the matching rule’, RDT
suggests that partner’s resources need to match the local firm’s specific resource needs
(Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). Some of the specific resources
partner firms may seek to acquire are regulatory support, market access, legitimacy,
physical assets information, and human capital (Hillman et al., 2009).
While RDT in alliance suggests that learning from a partner reduces future
dependency, such learning, if cooperative, may also develop trust among the partners
(Inkpen & Currall, 2004). When partners make their knowledge accessible to one
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another, it increases interactions, ensures knowledge sharing, and creates a sense of
familiarity (Koka & Prescott, 2002). Repeated and successful interactions among partners
will allow for mutual learning, increasing the trustworthiness in the relationship (Inkpen
& Currall, 2004). The positive effect of knowledge availability spirals upward to creating
cooperative learning among alliance partners (Mellat-Parast & Digman, 2008).
Hypotheses
Knowledge tacitness and resource asymmetry
Research on knowledge transfer suggests that explicit knowledge plays a critical role in
facilitating a learning race (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Templates, as well as vision,
mission, goals, and objectives, if written and codified, are easily acquired (Lyles & Salk,
2007). In contrast, tacit knowledge, often more valuable, is more challenging to transfer
among partners (Lyles & Salak, 2007; Rechberg & Syed, 2013). The inherent nature of
tacit knowledge is that it is embedded in people’s consciousness and difficult to articulate
(Polanyi, 1962). Organizational tacit knowledge is stored in a team’s norms, values, and
beliefs that evolve through continuous learning (Chou, 2005; Dong, Bartol, Zhang, & Li,
2017; Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). As organizational culture continuously evolves, it
becomes more difficult for firms to retrace all the steps related to the development of
cultural norms.
Tacit knowledge is causally ambiguous and challenging to understand and codify
(Chuang, Jackson & Jiang, 2016; Rechberg & Syed, 2014; Szulanski, 1996). To copy
tacit knowledge, the rival firm needs to comprehend all underlying cause-effect
relationships and find ways to apply that knowledge to their setting (Røvik, 2016). The
presence of cause-effect ambiguity creates a barrier to the imitation of knowledge by a
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partnering firm, thereby depressing the learning race (Barney, 1991; Brookes, 2014;
Uygur, 2013). For example, during a tour to New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.
(NUMMI), an alliance between Toyota and General Motors (GM), GM managers were
amazed to witness only a small number of defects in products. The high-quality
operational system of the NUMMI was responsible for generating superior products.
Although such standard of NUMMI was conspicuous, the underlying rationale was
challenging to communicate, and therefore, difficult for GM to internalize (Inkpen,
2000).
Partnering firms may not see immediate value in learning tacit knowledge.
Explicit and objective knowledge is visible, uncomplicated to acquire, and has immediate
value (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). For instance, in American based-joint venture between
American and Japanese firms, the American firm discounts the importance of product
quality knowledge of its Japanese counterpart, resisting to acquire such knowledge,
stating that it would never work in the U.S. (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). Tacit knowledge
may, therefore, depress the learning race among IJV partners.
Additionally, where resource asymmetry is present, the relationship between
knowledge tacitness and learning race is moderate (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). Resource
asymmetry refers to the imbalance and discrepancy of resources shared by partners in IJV
alliance. When tangible resource contribution in IJV is asymmetric, it will likely yield the
firm with the majority of equity a bargaining power. Indeed, Makhija and Ganesh (1997)
argue that the firm with more resources can maintain a dominant position in a joint
venture by developing control mechanisms such as contracts, rules and regulations, and
limiting transparency, preventing the effective transfer of knowledge (Hamel, 1991). The
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greater contribution of product and market knowledge in IJV increases the decisionmaking power on how to utilize resources. Therefore, a partner may seek to maintain
resource asymmetry to retain bargaining power (Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003).
The willingness to learn and the extent of the knowledge gap between partners
may matter. Minbaeva et al. (2018) find that the capacity to race to learn depends on the
attitude of receptivity, and if the knowledge gap is too big, the intent to acquire
knowledge may not ensure knowledge transfer (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In that
essence, higher resource asymmetry may depress the learning race. We, therefore,
hypothesize that:
H1. When resource asymmetry among partners is high, the local IJV partner commits
less to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly tacit.
Knowledge tacitness and resource complementarily
Complementary knowledge refers to the level of resource interdependence in the IJV
relationship where partners value the contribution of each other experience as necessary
to accomplish goals and responsibilities. Complementary knowledge may amplify the
learning race between IJV partners as acquiring it can change the balance of power
(Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). After receiving sufficient complementary knowledge, the
faster learning partner’s dependency on the IJV reduces. In contrast to overlapping
resources, complementary resources may expand the repertoire of a firm’s knowledge
repository facilitating innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Shenkar & Li, 1999).
Shenkar and Li (1999) found evidence that local IJV partners are likely to seek
knowledge that complements, rather than overlaps, with their current knowledge base.
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In IJV, tacit knowledge is more valuable to enhancing performance than explicit
information (Anh et al., 2006). When tacit knowledge is also complementary, the value
of such knowledge significantly increases because acquiring complementary knowledge
helps to create a unique resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013) that yields a competitive
advantage to both the firms in IJV (Anh et al., 2006). Yet, an organization’s ability to
learn additional tacit knowledge depends on their absorptive capacity (see, e.g., Anh et
al., 2006; Kostopoulos et al., 2011, Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001; Minbaeva et al., 2003).
Learning intent also determines whether or not a partner in IJV can acquire tacit
knowledge (Hau & Evangelista, 2007). When partners recognize the value of tacit and
complementary knowledge, partners will invest in training and development activities
that foster the acquisition of such knowledge (Anh et al., 2006; Hau & Evangelista,
2007), for this reason, we hypothesize:
H2: When resource complementary among partner is high, the local IJV partner commits
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly tacit.
Knowledge specificity and resource asymmetry
Knowledge specificity refers to the knowledge of IJV partners that is specific to a
particular functional area, formalized, and separated from other experiences. Knowledge
specificity could alleviate the causal ambiguity of knowledge and reduce complexity.
Complex knowledge has a higher degree of interrelated components, making it difficult
to understand (Winter, 1987). In contrast, specific knowledge may only require an
understanding of one or a few components (Hansen, 1999). Sequential processes of
accomplishing a task are often codified in a step-by-step process allowing IJV partners to
identify what has to be conducted (cause) to achieve a particular result (effect). The
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practice of delineating processes in a step-by-step fashion helps to reduce knowledge
tacitness, thereby creating a condition that is supportive of knowledge transfer and,
therefore, the learning race (Balconi, 2002; Cowan & Foray, 1997; Szulanski, 1996).
One of the primary reasons for firms to enter into an IJV relationship is to acquire
knowledge of a relational partner (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), and an alliance is an option
of gaining access to partners’ expertise and skills (Anh et al., 2006; Hamel, 1991). A high
degree of asymmetric resource commitment by IJV partners reinforces this concept. By
contributing the majority of resources to the IJV, a partner will have more bargaining
power (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997), maintaining control over the
alliance activities (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). To avoid the dominant control of a foreign
firm over a local firm, a local government may intervene to limit the equity ownership of
an international firm, as in the case of China before its entering into World Trade
Organization at the end of 2001 (Lee, Chen & Kao, 2003). But when such government
regulation is not in place, the local partner may try to shift the bargaining power in its
favor by involving in a learning race, as more knowledge resources ensure greater control
over the IJV in future (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997).
H3. When resource asymmetry among partners is high, the local IJV partner commits
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when knowledge is highly specific.
Knowledge specificity and resource complementarity
As organizations in IJV identify learning from their partner as a source to reduce resource
dependency, the learning race may occur only in specific areas that provide IJV partners
with the strategic control over complementary resources and activities (Mjoen &
Tallman, 1997). Such resources may be related to technology, marketing and distribution,
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and skills and expertise required to cater to market needs (Yan & Gray, 1994). When the
complementary knowledge from the partner combines with the expertise of the local
firm, it will result in the unique resource bundle (Yao et al., 2013). The possession of
unique resources may not only reduce the local firm’s resource dependency over the
foreign firm but also be the source of competitive advantage in its domestic market (Anh
et al., 2006), independent of the partner firm. For this reason, we hypothesize:
H4. When resource complementarity among partner is high, the local IJV partner
commits more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is
highly specific.
Knowledge availability and resource asymmetry
A high level of knowledge availability means that there is a minimal barrier for firms in
IJV to learn from each other (Yan & Gray, 1994). Partners are willing to share available
knowledge (Minbaeva et al., 2018) by encouraging the transfer of personnel between IJV
organizations (Inkpen, 2000). In an empirical study based on the data obtained from 219
IJV in Vietnam, Hau and Evangelista (2007) found that the foreign partners aiding local
partners through training and development enhances the ability to acquire explicit
knowledge. The accessibility of expertise also helps to foster trust among relational
partners. Where partners engage in developing relational capital conducive to creating a
favorable learning environment, employees from one organization have free access to
another’s knowledge (Park, 2011a). Yet to enable this essential element of knowledge
exchange, reciprocity in knowledge sharing among partners is necessary (Magnini, 2008;
Rechberg, 2018).
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The presence of resource asymmetry indicates a discrepancy in IJV partners’
resource contribution (Lee et al., 2003). When partners’ resources are complementary,
and both partners comply with the norms of reciprocity, both partners may contribute
equally to the IJV (Kwok et al., 2018). Therefore, there may be less motivation from
either party to hide knowledge or question other’s intent to engage in collaborative
learning. On the other hand, in the case of resource asymmetry, the continued willingness
to make knowledge available to partner to maintain symbiotic knowledge exchange could
be diminished as partners eye on increasing their bargaining power at the expense of the
other by involving in learning race behavior. We therefore theorize:
H5. When resource asymmetry among partners is low, the local IJV partner commits
more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is highly
available.
Knowledge availability and resource complementarity
One of the primary motives of the partners in IJV is to reduce the dependency over the
partnering firm and gain the upper hand in bargaining by learning (Steensma & Lyles,
2000). To that end, acquiring highly available knowledge plays a critical role. As
discussed, the complementary expertise of partners combined with the local knowledge
base yields higher value. Acquiring partners’ knowledge may not only enhance the value
of one’s experience but may result in an unrivaled resource bundle, which may be a
source of competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel, 1991). Since there
may be the incentive for partners to learn complementary knowledge, and the availability
of knowledge may facilitate such learning, we hypothesize that:
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H6. When resource complementarity among partner is high, the local IJV partner
commits more to the learning race in knowledge acquisition, when the knowledge is
highly available.
-------------------------Insert Figure 1 Here
-------------------------Method
The motivation to research equity-based IJVs in China is that broad diversity of foreign
investors and a dynamic environment have provided a rich research setting. Both Chinese
and international partners are highly motivated to learn from and with each other in this
fast-changing market (Guthrie, 2005). It is widely recognized that most foreign firms and
local Chinese firms enter into equity joint ventures to gain access to each other’s
knowledge (Luo, 2000). For example, local Chinese partners seek foreign partners’
proprietary technology and management know-how. In contrast, foreign partners are
interested in local partners’ resources in marketing, distribution channels, and the
relationships with the local government. Second, the nature of resource endowment in
equity joint ventures in China provides an excellent context to study IJV learning. Many
foreign companies entered China in the form of an IJV to reduce risks and uncertainty,
mostly due to cultural differences, distribution networks, political systems, and market
dynamism. These companies find it challenging to survive in that environment without
the help of a local partner. The resource endowment of both domestic and foreign firms
allows us to scrutinize how the differences in their resources will impact the learning
mechanism between them. Third, because of the unstable institutional environment and
high risks associated with international partners, some firms take IJVs as a short-term
solution to gain market advantage, with makes IJVs more unstable (Luo, 2000) setting
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the base for this study. In general, the setting in China offers all the factors that are
important to study the learning race, and it has a high generalizable value for
international management strategy, where cultures, logistics, political systems, and
market features are different.
Data collection
Preliminary in-depth interviews with three IJV managers were conducted to develop and
evaluate the tentatively developed questionnaire. We asked questions about their learning
motivation, resource conditions, and knowledge characteristics for competitive learning.
The interviews helped the researchers to explore the relationships between resource
condition, knowledge characteristics, and learning race. We also had discussions on the
measurement scale with professors with expertise in international marketing from the
local universities that participated in this study. The survey questionnaire was initially
developed in English, then translated into Chinese for data collection and back into
English for validity check and data analysis. We discussed the clarity, validity, and
feasibility of the questionnaire with a total of six bilingual scholars and professionals.
Three criteria were used to collect the data: 1) the firm had to be in an IJV with at
least one partner from a foreign country, 2) the IJV had employees from both parent firms
physically present, and 3) the local firm had more than 30 employees.
We used convenience sampling and collected data from middle and top-level
managers of IJVs, who were also part-time MBA students or MBA alumni from three
Chinese universities. Each university had a contact person who handled the data
collection process. The contact person handed out the survey at the end of their class and
collected the surveys at the beginning of class the following week. One school also
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contacted MBA alumni via phone calls, which requested their consent for the survey
study and emailed the questionnaire. For those who did not send the survey back, a
second wave of phone calls and emails were made to remind them. The overall response
rate was 51.3%, and 124 surveys were useable.
The assessment of potential response bias was done by making the comparison
between the early response and the late response, current students and alumni, as well as
comparing responses between the three universities (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Based
on the sales revenue, employee size, and IJV longevity, there was no statistically
significant difference in the mean of measured items between the early response and the
late response; also, the statistics did not indicate any significant difference among the
three universities. The sample represents a diverse array of industries, including
electronics, manufacturing, information technology, medical supplies, services,
construction, food manufacturing, electricity, and banking. For duplicate data, the lower
confidence score on the answers was removed as we measured how confident the
informant was on participants' responses at the end of the survey.
Measurement
Knowledge tacitness: This construct was defined as the extent of difficulty to
articulate and codify a given domain of knowledge. This scale was measured with five
items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly
Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92.
Knowledge specificity: This construct was defined as specific functional expertise,
such as product, marketing, and technological know-how. The scale was measured with
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three items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly
Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.84.
Knowledge availability: This construct described whether the knowledge is
available to the other party or not. The scale was measured with five items using a 7point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly Agree = 7.
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90.
Resource asymmetry: Resource asymmetry characterized the amount of resource
invested by individual parties and involved the comparison between the two parties in
terms of balance/discrepancy. The authors developed the scale based on Gundlach et al.’s
(1995) work and had participants report their perceptual estimate of the asymmetry of
resource commitment of the two parties in the IJV. The three items scale used a 7-point
Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree = 1 and Strongly Agree = 7. Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.86.
Resource Complementarity: We adapted Sarkar et al.’s (2001) scale and modified
it for the IJV context. The items characterized the level of resource interdependence in
the relationship and measured the extent to which both partners perceived the value of
resources and capabilities that the other brought to the relationship. The scale was
measured with four items using a 7-point Likert scale anchored with Strongly Disagree =
1 and Strongly Agree = 7. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.96.

Results
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
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Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to evaluate the measurement model. We
follow the evaluation procedure of model fitness suggested by Bagozzi and Yi (1988).
First, we use elliptical reweighted least squares to estimate the model, as the kurtosis
value is a little bit high. The model converged, and no anomalies appeared in the results,
such as improper solution or condition codes. The Chi-Square was significant (X2 (215) =
462.21, p < .01). According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), it can be caused by unknown
power levels, inadequate goodness-of-fit measure, or sensitivity to the sample size.
Therefore, we further checked other model fit indices and confirmed that the model fit
the data well (CFI = .93, IFI = .93, RMR = .08). Second, we examined the convergent
validity for all the factors. All the items have positive and significant standardized factor
loadings and variances. Each scale’s AVE is also above .50. Cronbach’s α also showed
excellent reliability (see Table 1). Third, we used one- and two-factor models to check
discriminant validity. The results suggest that all the factors are unique and their
measurements are exclusive to or have no overlap with each other.
To address common method variance, we used Harman’s one-factor test. The
exploratory factor analysis included the items for all six constructs. The unrotated factor
analysis extracted six principal components. The items did not load on any single,
common method factor (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). The most prominent factor takes less
than one-third of the variance. Moreover, a partial correlation test partial out the first
principal components. The results show that almost all the significant partial correlations
remained between the factors.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 1 Here
-----------------------------------Econometric model
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Generalized Linear Model (GLM) approach was used to test the model. The following
equation illustrates our hypotheses.
LEARNRACE = β0 + β1 TACIT + β2 SPCF + β3 AVAIL
+ β4 ASMTRY + β5 CMPL + β6 TACIT*ASMTRY
+ β7 SPCF*ASMTRY + β8 AVAIL*ASMTRY + β9
TACIT*CMPL + β10 SPCF*CMPL+ β11 AVAIL*CMPL + ε
Where
LEARNRACE = learning race between IJV partners
TACIT = knowledge tacitness
SPCF = knowledge specificity
AVAIL = knowledge availability
ASMTRY = resource asymmetry
CMPL = resource complementarity
Please see table 2 for results, which have strongly supported our hypotheses.
-----------------------------------Insert Table 2 Here
------------------------------------

The rival model 1 with just main effects explained 23% of the variance. Our
moderation improved the R-square to 37% and further improved to 45% with control
variables.
Tacitness of knowledge suggests a negative main effect on learning race (γ = 1.36, t = -2.62, p < .05). The moderation of resource asymmetry on the relationship
between tacitness and learning was not significant, not supporting H1, while resource
complementarity indicates a significant moderation, neutralizing the negative effect of
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high tacitness (γ = .24, t = 3.15, p < .01), resulting in H2 to be supported. Therefore,
complementary resources can foster the IJV partners’ motivation to acquire knowledge,
even if the knowledge tacitness prevents such knowledge transfer (see Figure 1). The
value of complementary resources might motivate the learning race, regardless of the
difficulty of acquiring tacit knowledge.
The main effects model suggests that complex knowledge encourages the learning
race between IJV partners, while specific knowledge provides fewer incentives on
competitive learning behavior. Nevertheless, where resource asymmetry is high, specific
knowledge moderately stimulates to learning race (γ =.12, t = 1.73, p<.10). For this
reason, highly specific knowledge, which is relatively easier to acquire, induces more
competitive learning when resource asymmetry is high than when it is low (see Figure 1).
Due to the power imbalance caused by asymmetric resources, acquiring specific
knowledge, which is fast and easy to acquire, can be a quick approach to reduce the
dependency on the other party. At the same time, resource complementarity increases the
value of specific knowledge, resulting in more learning race, even if the knowledge is
high specificity (γ =.17, t = 2.29, p < .05). For this reason, H3 and H4 are supported.
The main effects model also suggests that inaccessible knowledge is hard to
acquire, so we observe more learning race behavior when knowledge availability is high.
However, the effect of availability is depressed by high resource asymmetry (γ = -.21, t =
-3.44, p < .01). The moderation of resource complementarity shows no impact on
knowledge availability toward learning race. Thus, H5 was supported, but H6 was
rejected.
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LEARNRACE = β0 - 0.94 TACIT – 1.20 SPCF + 1.69 AVAIL
+ 0.29 ASMTRY - 0.42 CMPL – 0.03 TACIT*ASMTRY
+ 0.15 SPCF*ASMTRY – 0.21 AVAIL*ASMTRY
+ 0.15 TACIT*CMPL + 0.15 SPCF*CMPL
- 0.16 VAIL*CMPL + ε
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 Here
------------------------------------

Discussion
Our findings support that firms partake in IJV to learn from each other (Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997). Four out of six hypotheses tested are supported, indicating that the IJVs
analyzed are committed to the learning race. Partners’ knowledge bases seemingly satisfy
each other’s strategic learning needs supporting Hillman et al.’s (2000) ‘matching rule’
(see also Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Partners are committed to the learning race
whether knowledge is specific (H3 and H4) or available (H5). Only when knowledge
tacitness is high, the learning race behavior is significantly reduced.
When the knowledge structure is asymmetric, the relationship between knowledge
tacitness and learning race is statistically insignificant (not yielding support to H1). The
causal ambiguity of tacit knowledge when resources are asymmetric challenges local
partners to understand such knowledge (Chuang, Jackson & Jiang, 2016; Rechberg &
Syed, 2014; Szulanski, 1996). In such a situation, comprehending all underlying causeeffect relationships and finding ways to apply knowledge to the local setting appears to
be a real challenge, depressing the learning race. These findings are in line with Barney
(1991), Brookes (2014), Uygur (2013), and Røvik (2016). Moreover, acquiring tacit
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knowledge is challenging and time-consuming as tacit knowledge is embedded in
individuals (Polanyi, 1962). For example, Polanyi’s (1962) practical, situational, and
emotional types of tacit knowledge may be too implicit to shared. The existence of
valuable tacit knowledge may be beyond its holder awareness (Rechberg & Syed, 2014).
Tacit knowledge is often embrained, embodied, and embedded in individuals, making it
difficult to transfer (Collins, 1993).
To absorb tacit foreign knowledge, a local firm needs preexisting knowledge
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Resource complementarity can foster IJV partners’ drive to
acquire tacit knowledge. Park (2011b), for example, found that local partner receives
foreign technical knowledge only if it possesses the necessary skill set to absorb it. Our
findings confirm that in cases where partner’s resources are complementary, partners
commit to learning race (H2; see figure 1). Anh et al. (2006) confirm these findings by
explaining that local partners may be familiar with foreign complementary knowledge,
motivating the partner to invest in training and development activities to facilitate the
acquisition of tacit knowledge.
Successfully racing for tacit knowledge is of significant importance as tacit
knowledge is the most valuable source of competitiveness and the source of knowledge
creation (Kaufmann & Runco, 2009; von Krogh et al., 2000). Indeed, RDT suggests that
IJV can help firms gain access to valuable and complementary resources that are difficult
to replicate yet critical to address environmental uncertainties (Das & Teng, 2000;
Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, where knowledge is a source
of power, partners may deliberately refrain from sharing what they know to protect their
bargaining power (Rechberg & Syed, 2013; Rechberg, 2018). Inkpen (2000) speaks of
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knowledge protectiveness as one reason for the hindrance of learning race. The prospect
of a reciprocal joint learning experience that can enable both IJV partners to develop tacit
knowledge is damaged by opportunism (Cheng, Cai & Jin, 2016; Lumineau & Quélin,
2012).
Where knowledge is specific and available, partners partake in the learning race,
whether resources are complementary (H4) or asymmetric (H3 and H5) in nature.
Specific knowledge may be copied without extensive effort as such knowledge may be
explicit, codified, and sequential. Complementary resources combined with specific
knowledge ease knowledge acquisition because it only requires some previous
understanding (Hansen, 1999), facilitating the race to learn (Barney, 1991; Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Shenkar & Li, 1999). When knowledge is specific (H3 and H4), local
IJV partners commit to the learning race, more so when IJV partner’s resources
complementary is high (H4), and less so when resources asymmetry is high (H3).
Specific knowledge such as functional expertise, production, marketing, and
technological know-how, combined with the existing knowledge pool, can reduce
resource dependency. Where resource asymmetry exists, the race for specific knowledge
may enhance bargaining power (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel, 1991). For example,
Danis and Parkhe (2002), found that in a Hungarian–Western alliance, the Hungarian
partners learned specific methods of management from their partner, allowing them to
gain independence and competitiveness in the local market.
When the resources contributions are balanced, IJV partners become less
aggressive on learning race, particularly for highly available knowledge. Partners can
acquire available knowledge such as templets, written vision, mission, goals, and
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objectives without much effort (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Even though available
knowledge may exist beyond the IJV, limiting its sources for competitiveness, available
knowledge can be a valuable source of independence (Steensma & Lyles, 2000) and thus
worth racing for learning.
We did not find support for Hypothesis 6, which states that in the presence of high
knowledge availability and high resource complementarity, the local IJV partners commit
more to the learning race. On the contrary, in such a situation, the learning race declined.
By making knowledge available, partners had an easy access to each other’s knowledge,
assisting collaborative learning. When knowledge is widely accessible, maybe
collaborative -, rather than competitive - learning dominates the relationship.
Complementarity resources in IJV provide benefit to both the parties. In this situation,
each partner will have a vested interest in sustaining the ongoing relationship through
collaboration so that each can continue benefiting from the other's complementary
resources. As a result, the learning race, which may be viewed as a hindrance to
collaboration lessens (Larsson et al., 1998).
Implications for research
The findings of this study have implications for both theory and practice. First, RDT
presents that inter-partner relations result in dependency on other firms’ resources
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When the resources of partners match the local firm’s
specific resource needs, the dependence solidifies (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). In
IJV, alliance partners depend on each other for resources and expertise. They seek
regulatory support, market access, legitimacy, physical assets information, and human
capital (Hillman et al., 2009). The dependency will also result in bargaining power for the

Race to Learn -24
partner with more resources (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Lecraw, 1984; Yan & Gray,
1994). Resources in our study is knowledge, and the bargaining power could be increased
by increasing the knowledge gap and resource asymmetry. Bargaining power literature
presents that the more powerful firm in IJV enjoys management control (Lecraw, 1984;
Yan & Gray, 1994). It is reasonable to argue that a lesser powerful firm tries to reduce
the knowledge gap, and thus, dependency, as much as possible (Hamel 1991; Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997). We empirically identify ex-ante conditions – that is, some combinations
of knowledge characteristics and resources structure - under which the bargaining power
could shift. Our primary contribution to the bargaining power literature is that the shift in
bargaining power is difficult, especially when the knowledge is tacit in nature. Tacit
knowledge is causally ambiguous, embodied and encultured (Blackler, 1995). When
collaboration, rather than competitive learning, dominates the relationship, the shifting of
the bargaining power is of less relevance because partners are making their knowledge
widely available to one another at the outset.
Implication for practice
There is growing evidence from our research and others that the partners in IJV involve
in competitive learning for independence. The short-term benefit of competitive learning
comes at the expense of long-term benefits of collaboration. Competitive learning is a
threat to IJV survival. IJV longevity and durability allows partners to accumulate
knowledge and capabilities from each other, overcoming possible competitive
disadvantage and achieving global competitiveness (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Steensma
& Lyles, 2000). For emerging economies such as China, IJV survival ensures the
development of the private sector and establishes a strong presence in the region
(Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Our study indicated that the condition that could deter
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competitive learning in IJV is for both partners to make their knowledge widely available
to one another and decrease the inequality in IJV equity as much as possible.
Knowledge availability in the IJV relationship could also help develop trust
among IJV partners (Ke & Wei, 2007). Trust reflects good intent, reliability, and
competence of partners’ sharing their knowledge. When inter-organizational trust is
present, the partners do not foresee each other as competing for learning and taking
advantage of others to gain a bargaining power (Ke & Wei, 2007).
On a positive note, our study indicated that the presence of tacit knowledge,
which is the most valuables source of competitiveness, reduces learning race. Partners
could acquire tacit knowledge, which is embodied (know-how), encultured (shared
understanding), and embedded (organizational routine; Blackler, 1995), through longterm collaboration and not through competitive learning. Therefore, we recommend that
partners use caution when learning know-how. Moreover, we recommend IJV partners to
understand that tacit knowledge is not something that could be achieved hastily through
learning race, as doing so could only jeopardize IJV survival.
We also advise partners in IJV to take stock of their prerequisite knowledge or
absorptive capability, which is required to learn advance skills (Fang & Zou, 2010). To
that end, understanding differences in partner’s culture could be a good starting point.
Chinese managers stress on a long-term human resource management (HRM) such as
long term contract strategy whereas Western managers stress on a short term HRM
strategies such as hire-and-fire (Buck, Liu, & Ott, 2010). Differing national and
organizational culture leads to misunderstanding and friction between partners (Hau &
Evangelista, 2007), hampering the ability to absorb knowledge (Simonin, 1999)
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successfully. Culture-based factors that can restrain knowledge sharing include values,
norms, and individuals’ fairness perception (Kohlberg, 1981; Rechberg, 2018).
And lastly, to establish essential element of knowledge exchange, reciprocity in
knowledge sharing among partners is necessary (Rechberg, 2018). Learning from each
other results in reduced dependency, yet successful sharing knowledge among partners
may create a climate of trust in an alliance (Magnini, 2008).
Limitations and future studies
There are several limitations to this study. First, we rely on a single source data to
examine the learning race behavior in IJV. Both foreign and local firms could undertake
the learning race, solely relying on one respondent may therefore not provide a complete
picture of learning race behavior in IJV. Future research may collect data from both the
local and foreign firms to measure the learning race in IJV. Second, we use resource
structure as the environmental condition for the investigation of knowledge
characteristics and learning race. Other conditions could either deter or facilitate learning
race. We suggest for more research on the impact of absorptive capacity of firms, fairness
perception, the longevity of IJV, and organizational or national cultural differences to
investigate the intensity of learning race in IJV. Moreover, what effect does reciprocity
and trust have on learning race behavior in IJV? Third, we did not empirically address the
consequences of learning race behavior. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) present that the shift
in the bargaining power as a result of the learning race could lead to instability in IJV and
early termination of the alliance. In the future, researchers could examine the
consequences of learning race on IJV survival and longevity. In the hypotheses
development section, we briefly mentioned the importance of control mechanisms such
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as contracts, rules, and regulations that enable firms to protect their knowledge from
imitation by partner, however, we do not test the impact of control mechanisms on
learning race. It will be an exciting pursuit for future research to examine the extent of
the effect that control mechanisms have on preventing learning race. It is also essential to
understand how partners in IJV develop mechanisms to protect their tacit knowledge,
something that is difficult to bring under the purview of control mechanisms, such as
contractual agreement.
Conclusions
This study informs IJV theory and practice that knowledge characteristics and resource
structures impact IJVs’ learning race behavior. We use RDT to develop arguments for
our hypotheses. Our analysis of 124 IJVs shows that some interactions between
knowledge characteristics and resource structure are either more valuable or easier to
acquire than others. Namely, partners in IJV tend to commit more to learning race for
tacit and highly specific knowledge when organizations in IJV share complementary
resources. Moreover, partners commit more to learning race for highly specific
knowledge when resource asymmetry is high, and highly available knowledge when
resource asymmetry is low. In the discussion section, we provide the theoretical and
practical implications of our study. By conducting this study, we have identified
conditions that could lead to learning race in IJV. We recommend that partners in IJV
involve in long-term collaborative learning and avoid learning race, which may threaten
the survival of IJV. We also presented four limitations of this study and simultaneously
suggest research the future course of actions to address learning race behavior in IJVs.
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Figure 1. Race to learn: knowledge characteristics and resource structure

Knowledge
Tacitness

Resource
Complementarity

H1
Knowledge
Specificity

H2
H3

Learning Race

H4
H5

H6
Knowledge
Availability
Resource
Asymmetry

Race to Learn -35

Table 1. Confirmatory factor analysis and reliability test
Constructs/Items
Learning Race (AVE = .73, Cronbach’s α = .88)
We have tried to learn the knowledge/skills from our
partner as fast as we can.
Wherever possible, we have tried to be faster than our
partner in acquiring knowledge/skills.
We have been racing with our partner in learning from
each other.
Resource asymmetry (AVE = .72, Cronbach’s α = .86)
There has been an imbalance in the resource commitments
between our partner and us.
The discrepancy of the amount of resources committed by
our partner and us to the JV has been large.
Our partner and we have contributed approximately the
same amount of resources to the JV.
Resource complementarity (AVE = .87, Cronbach’s α =
.96)
Both partner firms have needed each other’s resources to
supplement their own resources.
Both partner firms have needed each other’s resources to
accomplish their goals and responsibilities.
Resources brought into the venture by each partner firms
have been valuable for each other.
Resources brought into the venture by each partner firms
have played an important role in the JV.
Knowledge Characteristics:
Tacitness (AVE = .68, Cronbach’s α = .92)
The knowledge/skills that we have tried to learn from our
partner->
are provided in specific manuals.
are clearly described with operating procedures.
are embodied in software or documentation.
are easily codifiable (in instructions, formulas, etc.)
are more explicit than implicit.
Specificity (AVE = .65, Cronbach’s α = .84)
are about specific functional areas.
can be specified by step-by-step.
can be separated from other things.
Availability (AVE = .60, Cronbach’s α = .89)
The knowledge/skills that we tried to learn from our
partner are accessible to our personnel.

Standard
Loading

R2

tvalue

.83

.69

.95

.90

10.94

.77

.59

8.79

.78

.61

.96

.92

9.25

.79

.62

8.43

.94

.88

.93

.86

18.30

.95

.90

19.25

.91

.82

16.88

.84
.86
.88
.83
.70

.71
.74
.77
.69
.49

10.82
11.07
10.14
7.95

.81
.88
.72

.65
.77
.52

9.44
7.58

.66

.44
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Employees from our firm had free access to our partner’s
knowledge/skills.
We could get hold of our partner’s knowledge/skills
whenever we want to.
Our partner was willing to share with us the
knowledge/skills.
There were no barriers for us to learn about the
knowledge/skills from our partner.
2
X (d.f. = 215, p < .01)
BBNFI
CFI
IFI
RMR

.72

.52

6.33

.91

.82

7.52

.77

.59

6.72

.80

.64

6.92

462.21
.91
.93
.93
.08
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Table 2. Regression model for learning race
Variables
Intercept
Knowledge tacitness
Knowledge specificity
Knowledge availability
Resource asymmetry
Resource complementarity
Moderations
Knowledge tacitness
×
Resource asymmetry
Knowledge specificity
×
Resource asymmetry
Knowledge availability
×
Resource asymmetry
Knowledge tacitness
×
Resource complementarity
Knowledge specificity
×
Resource complementarity
Knowledge availability
×
Resource complementarity
Control variables
Cultural compatibility
Interfirm rivalry
Trust
R-Square

Model 1
Main effects
(SE)
2.92***
-.11
.17*
.06
-.02
.19**

F Value
Root MSE
*p<.10. ; **p < .05. ; ***p < .01.

Model 2
Moderation
model (SE)
(.83)
(.08)
(.09)
(.08)
(.07)
(.09)

Model 3
Moderation model
with control
variables (SE)
7.47*
(4.35)
-1.36**
(.52)
-1.23**
(.56)
1.56
(.51)
0.34
(.52)
-1.03
(.63)

5.93
-.94*
-1.21**
1.69***
.29
-.42

(4.51)
(.53)
(.59)
(.54)
(.55)
(.64)

-.03

(.06)

-.03

(.06)

.15**

(.07)

.12*

(.07)

-.21***

(.06)

-.21***

(.06)

.15**

(.08)

.24***

(.08)

.15*

(.08)

.18**

(.08)

.16**

(.07)

-.13*

(.07)

-.04
.26***
.02

(.09)
(.07)
(.11)

.23

0.37

.45

7.04 (5, 118)

5.98 (11, 112)

6.28 (14, 109)

.99

.92

.88
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Figure 2. Moderating effects of resource complementarity and asymmetry

